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MECHANICS' LIENS: THE "STOP NOTICE"
COMES TO WASHINGTON
Washington's mechanics' lien laws were changed in two significant
respects by the legislature in its 1973 First Extraordinary Session. The
new Act,' only the fifth significant amendment to these laws since
their enactment in 1854,2 has two parts. The first, Section 2, allows a
potential mechanics' lien claimant (hereinafter a PLC)3 to assert a
priority against construction loan funds disbursed by the construction
lender after the PLC has notified the lender of his unpaid bill.4 To
assuage lenders, who naturally made vocal objection to this Section 2
priority, Section 3 makes a change in mortgage priorities long desired
by construction lenders; eliminating the rule of Elmendorf-Anthony v.
Dunn,5 Section 3 gives any future advances under a mortgage or deed
of trust priority over any encumbrance attaching to the property sub-
sequent to the recording of the mortgage, "regardless of when the
same [advances] are disbursed, or whether such disbursements are
obligatory.
' '6
1. Ch. 47, [1973] Wash. Laws, Ist Ex. Sess. [hereinafter referred to as ch.
47], amending WASH. REV. CODE ch. 60.04 (1963).
2. There have been four significant changes in the mechanics' lien law since its
initial enactment, §§ 1-7, [1854] Wash. Laws 392: (1) The provision limiting the
mechanics' lien to the amount due the general contractor from the owner at the time
the subcontractor gives notice of his claim to the owner, id. § 3, was dropped in
1873, § 3, [1873] Wash. Laws 442; (2) the owner's power to prevent a mechanics'
lien from attaching by posting a notice of nonresponsibility within ten days of
gaining knowledge of the improvement, § 1965, [1881] WASH. TERR. CODE, was re-
pealed by ch. 24, [1893] Wash. Laws 32; (3) ch. 45, § 1, [1909] Wash. Laws 71
added the present requirement of notice to the owner that the mechanics' lien may be
claimed, WASH. REV. CODE § 60.04.064 (1963); and (4) ch. 217, § 1, [1949] Wash.
Laws 709, allowed the owner to record notice to lien claimants that the improvement
is complete, thus putting a limit on the time lienors have to perfect their liens, WASH.
REV. CODE § 60.04.064 (1963).
3. "Potential mechanics' lien claimant" includes every person entitled to a lien on
real property under the provisions of WASH. REV. CODE §§ 60.04.010, .040, .1O
(Supp. 1972). This would, for example, include the general contractor, but not the
architect.
4. Ch. 47, § 2(2), (4), WASH. REV. CODE § 60.04.210(2), (4) (Supp. 1973).
5. 10 Wn. 2d 29, 36, 116 P.2d 253, 255 (1941). An encumbrance attaching sub-
sequent to a prior recorded mortgage or deed of trust for optional future advances
has priority as to all advances under such a mortgage or deed of trust made after the
mortgagee has notice of the subsequent encumbrance.
6. Ch. 47, § 3, WASH. REV. CODE § 60.04.220 (Supp. 1973) (emphasis added).
However, the mortgagee may still lose his priority if he continues giving "draws"
on the loan funds without withholding anything for the PLC after receipt of a notice
of claim or "stop notice" from the PLC. Ch. 47, § 2(6), WASH. REV. CODE § 60.04.210(6)
(Supp. 1973). See discussion in text accompanying notes 73-75 infra.
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The desirability of these changes is clear. Reliance on the tradi-
tional mechanics' lien to satisfy unpaid bills has often been a frus-
trating and disappointing experience for the PLC. A lender has always
been careful to record his construction loan mortgage before any
work begins on the project, making the mechanics' lien junior to the
mortgage. Furthermore, foreclosing a mechanics' lien is an expensive
and time-consuming procedure. 7 By allowing a PLC the additional
remedy of a qualified priority to the construction loan funds, the legis-
lature hoped that the PLC's bills would go unpaid less often.8 Section
3, as well as being a concession to lending interests displeased at the
prospect of having to withhold loan funds for unpaid PLC's in order
to continue "draws" for completion of the project, makes the mortgage
lender better able to predict the priority of future advances under
his mortgage. 9
This note will discuss both the PLC's new remedy and the new
priority given to mortgages for future advances. Both provisions will
make present construction industry practices more equitable: Section
2 has given PLC's a new, productive and efficient remedy, designed to
work with and improve the traditional real property lien, and Section 3
has repaired the damage done to lenders' mortgage priorities by a re-
cent Washington case.10 Both Sections do create new problems of
their own, however, which are also discussed.
I. OPTIONAL FUTURE ADVANCES VERSUS
INTERVENING ENCUMBRANCES
Gordon v. Graham, Il the first case to fix priorities between a mort-
gage for future advances and a subsequent mortgage, 12 gave absolute
priority to the first mortgagee. Though the first mortgagee was under
no obligation to make the advances, and had notice of the second
mortgage, "it was the Folly of the second Mortgagee, with Notice, to
7. See note 52 and accompanying text infra.
8. See note 53 infra.
9. The Washington court in National Bank of Washington v. Equity Investors.
81 Wn. 2d 886, 506 P.2d 20 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Columbia Wood Products],
made it difficult to predict how the priority between mortgages for future advances
and subsequent mechanics' liens would be established. See text accompanying
notes 34-40 infra.
10. Columbia Wood Products, supra note 9.
11. 22 Eng. Rep. 502 (Ch. 1714), overruled in Hopkinson v. Rolt, II Eng. Rep.
829 (H.L. 1861).
12. 3 G. GLENN, MORTAGES § 401 at 1608 (1943).
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take such Security."'13 American cases giving the prior mortgage for
future optional advances priority over intervening encumbrances
follow the reasoning of Gordon; i.e., that record notice to the junior
encumbrancer puts him upon inquiry as to the state of dealings be-
tween the parties to the first mortgage, and if that record reveals a
contract for optional future advances, he cannot later complain, for
he had notice of this superior claim before dealing with the mort-
gagor. 14 Although several states give optional future advances a statu-
tory priority,15 Texas appears to be the only state still adhering to
Gordon by judicial decision. 16
13. 22 Eng. Rep. at 502.
14. The clearest and most frequently cited exposition of the minority American
view is stated in Witczinski v. Everman, 51 Miss. 841, 846-47 (1876), overruled in
North v. McClintock, 208 Miss. 289, 44 So. 2d 412 (1950):
A mortgage to secure future advances, which on its face gives information as to
the extent and purpose of the contract, so that a purchaser or junior creditor may,
by an inspection of the record, and by ordinary diligence and common pru-
dence, ascertain the extent of the incumbrance, will prevail over the supervening
claim of such purchaser or creditor as to all advances made by the mortgagee
within the terms of such mortgage, whether made before or after the claim of
such purchaser or creditor arose. . . . The law requires mortgages to be recorded
for the protection of creditors and purchasers. When recorded, a mortgage is no-
tice of its contents. If it gives information that it is to stand as security for all
future indebtedness to accrue* from the mortgagor to the mortgagee, a person
examining the record is put upon inquiry as to the state of dealings between the
parties, and the amount of indebtedness covered by the mortgage, and is duly
advised of the right of the mortgagee by the terms of the mortgage to hold the
mortgaged property as security to him for such indebtedness as may accrue to
him. Thus informed, it is the folly of any one to buy the mortgaged property, or
take a mortgage on it or give credit on it, and if he does so, his claim must be
subordinated to the paramount right of the senior mortgagee, who in thus secur-
ing himself by mortgage, and filing it for record, as required by law, has ad-
vertised the world of his paramount claim on the property covered by his mort-
gage, and is entitled to advance money and extend credit according to the terms
of his contract thus made with the mortgagor, who cannot complain, for such
is his contract; and third persons afterwards dealing with him, cannot be heard
to complain, for they are affected with full notice, by the record, of what has
been agreed on by the mortgagor and mortgagee.
Accord, Freiberg v. Magale, 70 Tex. 56, 7 S.W. 684, 686 (1888). See Annot., 138
A.L.R. 566, 576-78 (1942). See also Spader v. Lawler, 17 Ohio Rep. 371, 382 (1848)
(Avery, J., dissenting); 4 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1199 n.20 (5th ed.
1941); Hopkinson v. Rolt, 11 Eng. Rep. 829, 843 (H.L. 1861) (Lord Cranworth
dissenting). In Hopkinson, Lord Cranworth preferred the Gordon rule for another
reason: "T] o depart from it may ... prospectively prevent advances of money by
bankers, or others, where such advances might be safely and usefully made."
15. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 697.04(1) (Supp. 1973); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§
45-506, 52-201 (1961) (but, mechanics' lien preferred to any prior encumbrance
with respect to improvements); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 447:12(a), 479:4 (Supp.
1972) (mechanics' lien preferred to prior construction loan mortgage with respect
to both land and improvements); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-25-1 (1970) (optional
advances protected only up to $3000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 45-55 (1962).
16. Freiberg v. Magale, 70 Tex. 56, 7 S.W. 684 (1888); AJ. Wood v. Parker
Square State Bank, 400 S.W. 2d 898, 900 (Tex. 1966). See Jones, Mortgages Secur-
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The great majority of American courts do not follow Gordon, and,
while giving priority to obligatory advances by the prior mortgagee,
17
subordinate any optional advances to intervening encumbrances of
which the prior mortgagee has notice. 18 Professor Osborne isolates
four reasons cited by courts for cutting off the priority of "optional"
advances: (1) Because the mortgagee makes advances only voluntar-
ily, rather than a single lien arising for all the advances at the time the
mortgage is recorded, a separate lien attaches at, and dates from, the
time each advance is made;19 (2) a mortgagee who is under no duty to
make advances should not be able to prejudice the security of a subse-
quent encumbrancer; 20 (3) unless subsequent lienors are given priority
against the possibility of later optional advances, the mortgagor in ef-
fect perpetrates a fraud against them;21 (4) courts have a desire to
keep the mortgagor's title free for additional mortgages by others, or
for sale.
22
ing Future Advances, 8 TEXAS L. REV. 371 (1930). However, Texas does subordinate
prior mortgages to subsequent mechanics' liens with respect to improvements. TEXAS
CIV. STAT. ANN. § 5459 (Vernon Supp. 1972-73).
17. G. OSBORNE, MORTGAGES § 216 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as OSBORNE].
18. Elmendorf-Anthony Co. v. Dunn, 10 Wn. 2d 29, 36, 116 P.2d 253. 255
(1941); OSBORNE, supra note 17, § 216. Courts are split on whether constructive no-
tice to the prior mortgagee is sufficient notice. Note, Mortgages-Advance Money Pro-
visions, 29 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 741-43 (1954). What notice is required in Washing-
ton is undecided. 18 WASH. L. REV. 24, 31 (1943). Since inchoate mechanics' liens
are not of record, a requirement of actual notice seems preferable.
19. OSBORNE. supra note 17, § 117. Osborne criticizes this "mechanical reasoning,"
which may lead to a good result but obscures the policy considerations upon which
the result is really based. Id. See I L. JONES, MORTGAGES § 456 (8th ed. 1928); cf.
Home Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. Burton, 20 Wash. 688, 56 P. 940 (1899); 2 G. GIL-
MORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY §§ 35.3, 35.4 (1965) [hereinaf-
ter cited as GILMORE]; see also R. KRATOVIL, MODERN MORTGAGE LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 116(1972).
20. OSBORNE, supra note 17, § 117(a). Columbia Wood Products, 81 Wn. 2d
at 900, 506 P.2d at 29-30 (1973), see text accompanying notes 34-40 infra, justified
giving priority to a mechanics' lien that was subsequent to the mortgage in question
on a similar view: "A contrary rule . . . would allow a lender [who had reserved the
right to pay subcontractors out of the mortgage loan funds] . . . to sit idly by and
watch his security grow, while at the same time potentially leaving the materialmen.
subcontractors and workmen in the position of doing their work and supplying ma-
terials for little or nothing." Accord, Cedar v. W. E. Roche Fruit Co., 16 Wn. 2d 652.
666, 134 P.2d 437, 443 (1943): "The general rule that optional advances after actual
notice of an intervening mortgage will not be accorded priority, is based upon the
theory that the first mortgagee should not be permitted to additionally encumber the
mortgaged property voluntarily, to the detriment of subsequent encumbrancers."
21. OSBORNE. supra note 17, § 117(a). However, "[i]f this were the reason for the
doctrine it would seem that the concealed and the extremely broad and highly indefinite
mortgage for future advances should be invalidated completely rather than merely
ending their priority as to later advances." Id.
22. Id. Osborne finds this reason "the most satisfactory explanation of the de-
cisions," and that it makes sense out of the distinction most courts draw between op-
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The Washington court joined this majority when it held in Elmen-
dorf-Anthony v. Dunn23 that optional advances-should be subordinate
to intervening liens, simply because the court found this rule has "the
support of the almost universal weight of authority. 24 Elmendorf
defined an optional advance as one which is "voluntarily made" by
the mortgagee;25 an "obligatory" advance was described in Cedar v.
W.E. Roche Fruit Co. 2 6 as an advance the mortgagee is "contrac-
tually bound to make"27 or one "essential to his own security.
'28
Section 3 has in effect overruled these cases, returning to the
Gordon rule by giving optional advances protection against subse-
quent encumbrances, especially mechanics' liens.29 Why this break
from "almost universal authority"? There are three reasons: First,
Gordon has always been a much more desirable rule to mortgage len-
ders and their title insurers who understandably do not like to gamble
that the security for their advances will not be encumbered by inter-
vening mechanics' liens. Second, the increased security given con-
struction loan mortgages makes investment in Washington construction
more attractive. The third and perhaps most immediate cause for leg-
islative approval of Section 3 was that while the legislature was
tional and obligatory advances. "[I] f optional advances had an absolute preference,
the mortgagor, although having no right to demand the contemplated additional de-
mands, would be unable to obtain financing elsewhere for no one else would lend on a
security which could be cut down by subsequent action by the first mortgagee. And,
for like reason, the mortgagor would be unable to sell the property." Id. See Hopkin-
son v. Rolt, I 1 Eng. Rep. at 845 (Lord Chelmsford concurring); Blackburn, Mortgages
to Secure Future Advances, 21 Mo. L. REv. 209, 229-30 (1956).
23. OWn.2d 29, 116 P.2d 253 (1941).
24. Id. at 36, 116 P.2d at 255. In fact, the court was "inclined to view the rights
of the first mortgagee relative to advances made pursuant to an optional clause in a
construction contract, even after notice of a junior encumbrance, as superior to such
junior encumbrance." Id. at 38, 116 P.2d at 256.
25. Id. at41, 116 P.2d at 258.
26. 16Wn.2d651, 134P.2d437(1943).
27. Id. at 663-64, 134 P.2d at 442.
28. Id. at 664, 134 P.2d at 442, citing L. JONES, CHATTEL MORTGAGES
AND CONDITIONAL SALES § 97 (6th ed. 1933).
29. [E] xcept as provided in RCW 60.04.0-50 or in this 1973 amendatory act any
mortgage or deed of trust shall be prior to all liens, mortgages, deeds of trust
and other encumbrances which have iot been recorded prior to the recording of
such mortgage or deed of trust to the extent of all sums secured by such mort-
gage or deed of trust regardless of when the same are disbursed or whether such
disbursements are obligatory.
If recorded first, the prior mortgage may yet lose its priority over subsequent encum-
brancers, if the mortgage is one for a construction loan and the mortgagee did not
comply with the "notice to withhold" construction- loan funds for lien claimants as
provided for in ch. 47, § 2, WASH. REv. CODE § 60.04.210 (Supp. 1973). See text
accompanying notes 73-75 infra.
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holding hearings on the proposed act, the Washington Supreme Court
reaffirmed in form but substantially changed in spirit the rule of El-
mendorf-Anthony. In National Bank of Washington v. Equity Inves-
tors (hereinafter cited by its common name, Columbia Wood Products)30
the court found a typical construction loan agreement to be one for
optional advances for the purpose of assigning priorities between it and
an intervening mechanics' lien,31 even though by the W. E. Roche
definition of "obligate" the agreement certainly did obligate the mort-
gagee to make the advances.
Gilmore calls the distinction between optional and obligatory ad-
vances "nonsensical": 32 "There are few, if any, future advance clauses
which an astute judge cannot, at will, classify on one side or the other
of the line between obligatory and voluntary." 33 The Columbia Wood
Products decision lends credence to Gilmore's theory. The court
found that a construction loan mortgage providing as conditions pre-
cedent to the mortgagee's duty to make advances the approval of an
architect as to job progress and the requirement that all work be done
"in a good and workmanlike manner," and reserving for the mort-
gagee the right to make advances "at such time and in such amounts
as the Lender shall determine,"34 gave the mortgagee such broad dis-
cretionary powers that the mortgage would be classified as one for
optional rather than mandatory future advances for the purpose of
determining its priority relative to appellant's mechanics' lien.35
The court observed that had it been asked by the borrower to
compel an advance, these conditions to the mortgagee's duty to make
an advance would have presented "nearly insuperable obstacles at
law." 36 The court's reasoning is unpersuasive. If the conditions pre-
cedent, such as progress reports and architect's approval, had been
met by the borrower, fulfillment of the remaining condition of per-
sonal satisfaction with the quality of the work would have been deter-
mined by deciding whether a "reasonable man" would have been sa-
tisfied, since the contract was one for construction to specifications. 37
30. 81 Wn. 2d 886, 506 P.2d 20 (1973).
31. Id. at 890, 506 P.2d at 24.
32. GILMORE, supra note 19, § 35.4.
33. Id.
34. 81 Wn. 2d at 897-98, 506 P.2d at 28 (emphasis omitted).
35. Id. at 890, 506 P.2d at 24.
36. Id. at 898-99, 506 P.2d at 24.
37. 3A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 646 at 93-94, 98-99 (1960). See also Gould v.
McCormick, 75 Wash. 61, 66, 134 P. 676, 678 (1913): "Where the contract provides
690
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A finding that the lender reserved a true option to advance the funds
at his pleasure was not justified by the expectations or understanding
of the parties nor by the document itself; the written contract imposed
an obligation to loan the entire amount and a specified schedule for
advances based upon the stage of construction.
38
In expanding the scope of "optional" advances for the purpose of
assigning lien priorities to include other than truly voluntary adv-
ances, 39 the court has left by the wayside the very understandable and
workable Elmendorf rule,40 leaving to speculation the form a con-
that the work or material shall be of a specific character and to the satisfaction of one
of the parties, the right to terminate exists only when there is dissatisfaction and the
same is based upon reasonable grounds."
38. Paragraphs one and fifteen of the construction loan agreement read:
I. Subject to the terms and conditions of this agreement, Lender will lend to
Borrower at Lender's principal place of business at Tacoma, Washington, the sum
of $1,750,000.00 [Brief for the Respondent at 18, Columbia Wood Products,
supra note 9].
15. The said loan to be advanced at such times and in such amounts as the
Lender shall determine, but tentatively in installments in accordance with the
following schedule:
(a) Not later than the tenth day of each month for all expenses incurred during
the previous month and approved as due and payable by the architect ....
[Brief for the Appellant at 23, Columbia Wood Products, supra note 9].
If the lender continued to make advances after the borrower had violated the terms
of the building contract such advances might be "optional." The appellants made this
argument (Brief for the Appellant at 21, Columbia Wood Products), but the court
does not base its holding on this ground.
39. The court may be using a roundabout way to give mechanics' lien claimants
an "equitable lien" in such circumstances. See Miller v. Mountain View Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 238 Cal. App. 2d 644, 48 Cal. Rptr. 290 (1965); Lefcoe and Schaffer, Con-
struction Lending and the Equitable Lien, 40 S. CAL. L. REV. 439 (1967). A similar
result, at least, should be achieved by Section 2 of ch. 47 (see text accompanying
notes 52-88 infra) which requires lenders to withhold enough undisbursed construc-
tion loan funds to cover the unpaid bills of potential lien claimants. For an argument
that the equities lie with the construction lender rather than the mechanics' lien
clairbant in this situation, see General Mortgage Corporation of Iowa v. Campbell,
258 Iowa 143, 138 N.W.2d 416, 421 (1965):
Equities which might favor a mechanic's lienholder whose work or material
has enhanced the value of the security of a prior lienholder are not present in a
construction loan. There is no inequitable windfall of increased security here
because the loan was made with the expectation that the proceeds would be used
to construct the improvement. The mortgagee was counting on the improvement
to provide adequate security for the loan. . . . A laborer or a supplier can pro-
tect himself by examining the records before furnishing labor or material on the
project in question and by making satisfactory arrangements for payment ...
Appellees argue the mortgagee is in effect a trustee of the loan proceeds of a
construction loan for the benefit of the materialmen and its conduct in paying
the loan proceeds to the mortgagor directly was so inequitable the lienholder
should prevail regardless of the statutory interpretation. We do not agree. Mort-
gagee's duties to the public were discharged when it complied with the recording
statutes. It is not required to disburse the funds in any particular manner.
40. In Elmendorf-Anthony, the mortgage in question contained a construction
contract with a rider stating that if work on the building stopped for fifteen days,
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struction loan agreement would have to take in the future to insure
the priority of future advances made under it.
Perhaps Columbia Wood Products would not have been so hard on
construction lenders if typical construction loan agreements did, in
fact, give the lender substantially less discretion over the disbursement
of funds than the one drawn up by the lender in that case. But while
the bank might have made clearer its obligation to make each advance
the agreement, nevertheless, was not atypical, 41 and parties to such
agreements certainly believe they are obligated. Columbia Wood
Products, if left in effect by the legislature, would have created great
difficulties for the construction lender. To assure himself of the
priority of his security, he would have had to exercise such careful
and complete supervision over the project that it might have made
more economic sense for him to have lent his money elsewhere. 42
Section 3, however, relieves the lender of having to guess at the
priority of his advances under the Columbia Wood Products holding.43
This certainty is not unmerited. The construction lender performs a
service at least as valuable as that of the subcontractors. 44 The task of
"the mortgagee may, at its option, also enter into and upon the mortgaged premises
and complete the construction of said building . . . and monies expended by the mort-
gagee in connection with such completion of construction shall be added to the prin-
cipal amount ...... 10 Wn. 2d at 31, 116 P.2d at 254 (emphasis added). The court
had no trouble in finding that such an advance by the mortgagee was "in the exercise
of its option . . . and not pursuant to a mandatory duty." Id. at 41, 116 P.2d at
258. In two Washington cases in which the mortgage money was to be advanced as
construction progressed, the court found the advances obligatory. Home Savings &
Loan v. Burton, 20 Wash. 688, 56 P. 940 (1899); Keltch, Inc. v. Hoyt, Inc.,
4 Wn. App. 580, 483 P.2d 135 (197 1).
41. Chase Manhattan Bank's "form" Building Loan Agreement contains several
conditions precedent to the lender's obligation to make advances, such as the lender's
receipt of title and other insurance policies and approval by the lender's architect of
improvements made and to be made with respect to the plans and also gives the
lender the right to exercise "absolute discretion" in establishing "to its satisfaction"
the existence or nonexistence of facts critical to this obligation. PRACTICING LAW
INSTITUTE, REAL ESTATE CONSTRUCTION 203-27 (1969).
42. "[A] construction money loan made on the basis of optional advances dilutes
the security to the point that it becomes more of a general credit signature loan, than
a mortgage transaction." Spradling, Legal Hazards of Construction Lending, 19
Bus. LAW. 221, 223 (1963).
43. Of course, even under § 3 the lender or his title insurer must still make a
physical inspection of the building site, for if the mortgage is not recorded prior to
the commencement of construction some of the mortgage's priority is already lost.
A subcontractor, whose lien attaches when he begins his work on the site, retains
priority over subsequently recorded mortgages. WASH. REV. CODE § 60.04.050 (1963).
44. The importance of the lender is recognized in states where mechanics' liens
lose their priority with respect to the improvement when the loan money is actually
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balancing interests in each construction project-those of the lender,
contractor, owner-borrower, subcontractors and title insurer-is
much more a practical problem than a strictly legal one. The con-
struction industry depends on the lender for financing, but he will not
provide it unless he can be given assurance, by a title policy45 or other-
wise,46 that he will not be deprived of the security of his loan by
subsequent lien claimants. Unfortunately, neither the one hundred-year-
old mechanics' lien law, nor the priorities established in Elmendorf-
Anthony or Columbia Wood Products show much concern for these
business realities.
47
Osborne suggests that the policy motivating courts to subordinate
optional advances to subsequent liens is the desire to keep the mortga-
gor's property free for alienation or encumbrance by a second mort-
gagee or lien claimant. 48 Does Section 3, by erasing the distinction
between obligatory and optional advances, violate this policy? Section
3 should have, in fact, no adverse effect on the availability of second
mortgages, since the second mortgagee ought to be able to obtain an
agreement from the first mortgagee that the first mortgagee will make
no further advances except for taxes, insurance or repairs necessary to
preserve the security. 49 It has been suggested that the second mort-
used for construction. Comment, Priorities Between Mortgages and Mechanics' Liens,
36YALE LJ. 129, 133 (1926).
45. The pre-ch. 47 itle insurance policy secured by the lender guaranteed that
the construction loan mortgage had priority as of its recording, but did not guaran-
tee the priority of later advances under the mortgage against intervening mechanics'
liens. Interview with Frank Soderling, Vice President, Security Title Insurance Com-
pany, in Seattle, Nov. 6, 1973. In spite of this limited protection, title companies suf-
fered their biggest losses from insuring construction mortgages against mechanics'
liens. Minutes of Washington State Legislature House of Representatives Judiciary
Comm. Hearing on S.H.B. 264, 1st Extra. Sess., Feb. 7, 1973.
46. To insure that all potential mechanics' lienors are paid by the owner or
general contractor, the lender uses progress payment systems, job certification systems,
"voucher" or "joint check" systems, but they are fallible and are another cost added
to construction. See R. KRATOVIL, MODERN MORTGAGE LAWAND PRACTICE § 214-17(1972).
47. For example, the court in Columbia Wood Products, though admitting that
the mortgagee-lender's building loan agreement is "sound banking practice," still finds
that the agreement's conditions operated "in law" to subordinate the lender's first-
recorded lien to the appellant's mechanics' lien. 81 Wn. 2d at 896, 506 P.2d at 28.
48. See note 22 supra.
49. Montana, a state which also gives optional advances priority, provides a simple
solution, a statutory procedure whereby a mortgagor may record an agreement with
the first mortgagee that no further optional advances will be made under the first
mortgage. MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 52-201 (1961). Such a subordination agreement
may be recorded in Washington. See WASH. REv. CODE § 65.08.060 (1963); Richards
v. Lawing, 175 Wash. 544, 27 P.2d 730 (1933).
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gagee should have no trouble obtaining such an agreement from the
first mortgagee.5
0
The mechanics' lien was an unsatisfactory remedy before the new
act5  and is made even less valuable by Section 3; no mechanics'
lienor relying solely on his real property lien will get a priority over
advances given under a prior recorded mortgage, as did the appellants
in Columbia Wood Products. He will have to take whatever equity
remains in the property after a prior mortgage or deed of trust is fully
satisfied. Section 2, however, provides the PLC with a new, indepen-
dent and cumulative remedy-a priority to certain construction loan
funds disbursed by the construction lender after the lender receives
notice of the PLC's claim.
II. THE "STOP NOTICE" COMES TO WASHINGTON
A mechanics' lien provides especially poor protection for a subcon-
tractor with a smaller claim; not only is his lien usually junior to a first
recorded construction mortgage, but the time and expense needed to
perfect the lien are not justified by the amount of the unpaid bill. 52
Section 2 of the Act responds directly to this unsatisfactory state of
affairs53 by providing the potential mechanics' lien claimant (PLC) 5
4
50. Interview with Eric Pucher, Vice President and Assistant General Counsel,
Firstbank Mortgage Corporation, in Seattle, Sept. 5, 1973. The first mortgagee in this
situation should not object to discontinuing further advances; once the project is
finished, the first mortgagee's funding is normally at an end.
51. See text accompanying note 52 infra.
52. [M] ore Mechanics' Liens remain unfiled than are filed, all by reason of the fact
that the party with the inchoate right to file the lien says to himself, "Oh, what's
the use? The lien is of no value . . .I am with a lien right sitting behind a trust
deed to which the legislature has seen fit to give priority over the lien right. There
are numerous other lien claiments. The building is incomplete. The holder of the
trust deed is about to foreclose it unless I consent to a ten cent on the dollar settle-
ment. I am going to have to hire a lawyer in order to foreclose my lien and I
will probably get wiped out by the trust deed."
Comment, California Mechanics' Liens, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 331, 356-57 n.197 (1963).
53. Ch. 47, § 2, WASH. REV. CODE § 60.04.210 (Supp. 1973). "The bill meets
the need for some procedure assuring that mechanics' [sic] and materialmen will
not to be left with meaningless liens...." REPORT TO THE SPEAKERS OFFICE ON H.B. 264.
54. "'Potential lien claimant' means any person or entity entitled to assert lien
rights pursuant to this chapter [WASH. REV. CODE ch. 60.04 (1963)] and has other-
wise complied with the provisions of this chapter and the requirements of chapter
18.27 RCW if required by the provisions thereof." Ch. 47, § 1(4), WASH. REV.
CODE § 60.04.200(4) (Supp. 1973). A general contractor may use the stop notice,




on a private55 and unbonded 56 construction project with a priority on
certain construction loan funds57 disbursed by the lender after notice
from the PLC of an unpaid bill. The new priority may be claimed by
serving a notice of claim-a stop notice-on the construction lender
when a payment on the PLC's purchase order or contract is more
than twenty days overdue.5 8 Section 2 also opens a new line of com-
munication between lender and subcontractors, with the hope of "red
flagging" nonpayment of subcontractors and exposing potential me-
chanics' liens early in the project.59
A number of states have adopted the statutory device of "stop no-
tice,"'60 granting the potential mechanics' lienor what is in effect a
garnishment of construction loan funds held by the lender or owner.
61
This, however, is not the effect of the Section 2 stop notice in Wash-
ington, because the lender need not withhold any loan funds in re-
sponse to the stop notice unless he so elects. When the lender receives
a stop notice he is given, in effect, three options. First, if the lender
55. Ch. 47 [1973] Wash. Laws, supplements WASH. REV. CODE ch. 60.04 (1963)
which covers private projects only.
56. If a lender obtains a payment bond for at least 50% of the financing, the § 2
priority to certain construction loan funds is not available to the potential lien claim-
ant if he's covered under the bond. See discussion of bonding accompanying notes
83-88 infra.
57. The construction loan fund which is the target of the § 2 priority is the loan
fund established between the lender and the borrower, a fund to be used solely for
the contemplated project and to be disbursed piecemeal in draws by the lender to the
general contractor as progress is made on the project. Loan funds to acquire real
property, to acquire personal property not subject to a mechanics' lien and to pay
specified costs and fees are unaffected by § 2. See ch. 47, § 1(2), WASH. REV. CODE
§ 60.04.200(2) (Supp. 1973).
58. Ch. 47, § 2(2)-(4), WASH. REV. CODE § 60.04.210(2)-(4) (Supp. 1973).
59. G. Mooney, Implementing the Law Relating to Liens, Including Mechanics'
and Materialmen's Liens, Mar. 28, 1973 (Bill Digest Form, H.B. 264).
60. California, for example, has an extensive statutory scheme for stop notices on
private projects. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 3156-72 (West Supp. 1973). See also ALA.
CODE tit. 33, § 37 (1959); IND. ANN. STAT § 32-8-3-9 (1973); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 85-7-181 (1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-18 (Supp. 1971); NJ. REV. STAT. §§
2A: 44-77, 78 (1951); TEXAS Civ. STAT. ANN. § 5463 (Vernon Supp. 1972-73). A
Washington mechanics' lien statute similar in principle is WASH. REV. CODE § 60.04.110
(1963), which allows the owner to withhold funds from the contractor if mechan-
ics' liens are filed.
61. While this right is usually conferred by the same statutes which provide for
mechanics' liens and is termed a "lien," the remedy provided is really more in
the nature of an equitable garnishment, or, as frequently stated, the notice to
the owner has the effect of working an assignment pro tanto of that which is due
or to become due from the owner to the contractor from the time of the service
of such notice. The remedy is distinct and disconnected from, and additional to,
the remedy by lien on the land and building. ...
57 CJ.S. Mechanics' Liens § 114 (1948) (footnotes omitted).
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chooses to allow further draws upon the construction loan fund, he
"shall withhold" funds to satisfy the stop notice from these "next and
subsequent draws."62 Second, if the lender chooses to continue draws
without withholding funds for the stop notice, he suffers the "penalty"
of Section 2(6), and his mortgage is subordinated to the subsequent
mechanics' lien of the stop notice claimant "to the extent of the in-
terim or construction financing wrongfully disbursed, but in no event
in an amount greater than the sums ultimately determined to be due
the potential lien claimant by a court of competent jurisdiction, or
more than the sum stated in the notice, whichever is less." '63 Third, the
lender may avoid the effect of the stop notice altogether by making no
further loan advances and foreclosing his mortgage. In this last situa-
tion, the PLC's only recourse is to his mechanics' lien which will have
no enhanced priority by reason of the stop notice.
The first option, paying the PLC's stop notice claim is the most de-
sirable notice to the lender for two reasons: (1) The amount of a stop
notice claim is limited to payments due the PLC during a twenty day
period. Therefore, in almost all cases the stop notice claim will be for
one contract payment only. Thus, the lender will have to withhold
only a relatively small amount for the stop notice. (2) Neither of the
other two options open to the lender would normally be desirable.
The lender does not want the PLC's mechanics' lien put ahead of his
mortgage, nor will he want to foreclose his mortgage if the project is
unfinished.
How does a PLC make use of the notice of claim remedy, or "stop
notice" as it's called in other states? 64 To perfect a stop notice the Act
requires that the PLC both maintain his right to a mechanics' lien
under R.C.W. ch. 60.0465 and properly file the special notice of claim
to loan funds. A proper filing of the notice of claim requires that
within twenty days after a payment is twenty days overdue on his con-
tract or purchase order, a PLC must give notice 66 to the lender67 of
62. Ch. 47, § 2(4), WASH. REV. CODE § 60.04.210(4) (Supp. 1973).
63. Ch. 47, § 2(6), WASH. REV. CODE § 60.04.210(6) (Supp. 1973).
64. The same remedy is called "stop notice" in California, CAL. CIV. CODE §§
3156-72 (West Supp. 1973); and elsewhere. 57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 114 (1948).
65. The stop notice lien is available only to a person or entity also entitled to
assert mechanics' lien rights pursuant to WASH. REV. CODE ch. 60.04 (1963). as
amended ch. 47, § 1(4), WASH. REV. CODE § 60.04.200(4) (Supp. 1973). Interview
with Rep. Richard Kelley, Cosponsor, S.H.B. 264, in Seattle. Nov. 13, 1973.
66. The PLC's notice to the lender must include:
(1) A statement that the claimant has furnished labor, materials or equipment for
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the sums due and to become due, for which he is entitled to a mechan-
ics' lien under R.C.W. ch. 60.04. When the lender receives the notice
he may withhold from next and subsequent draws made on the con-
struction loan fund an amount for the claimant, as determined by the
formula in Section 2(4),68 based on the percentage of the completed
work attributable to the claimant as of the date of the most recent cer-
tification of job progress received from the general contractor and
owner,69 less any sums already paid the claimant and any contracted
retainage.
7 0
which he would be entitled to a lien under WASH. REV. CODE ch. 60.04 (1963);
(2) the name of the general contractor, agent or person ordering the same;
(3) a street address of the real property being improved, or if there is none, a legal
description;
(4) a description of the services, material or equipment provided by the claim-
ant;
(5) the name, business address and phone number of the claimant.
The notice must be sent by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested,
with copies to the owner and general contractor. Ch. 47, § 2(3), WASH. REV. CODE §
60.04.210(3) (Supp. 1973). The notice must be sent at least 20 but not more
than 40 days after payment on the claimant's bill is due. Ch. 47, § 2(2), WASH. REV.
CODE § 60.04.210(2) (Supp. 1973). The claimant should carefully follow all the
above steps; the Washington court has held that because the mechanics' lien is a
remedy not available at common law the statute will be strictly construed. Wells v.
Scott, 75 Wn. 2d 922, 454 P.2d 378 (1969). This reasoning should also apply to the
stop notice.
67. A "lender" is "any person or entity regularly providing interim or construc-
tion financing." Ch. 47, § 1(1), WASH. REV. CODE § 60.04.200(1) (Supp. 1973).
68. The amount to be withheld by the lender is not necessarily the amount
claimed by the PLC in his notice:
[T] he lender shall withhold from the next and subsequent draws such percentage
thereof as is equal to that percentage of completion as certified . . . which is
attributable to the potential lien claimant as of the date of the certification of job
progress for the draw in question less contracted retainage. The percentage of
completion attributable to the lien claimant shall be calculated from said cer-
tification of job progress, and shall be reduced to reflect any sums paid to or
withheld for the potential lien claimant....
Ch. 47, § 2(4), WASH. REV. CODE § 60.04.210(4) (Supp. 1973). This formula is
confusing to many in the construction industry, including the mortgage bankers who
must use it. Interview with Frank Soderling, supra note 45. One result of this con-
fusion may be that in order to avoid the risk of their lien being subordinated to the
subcontractor's claim by the penalty clause of ch. 47, § 2(6), WASH. REV CODE §
60.04.210(6) (Supp. 1973), construction lenders will simply withhold all of the claim.
Interview with Eric Pucher, supra note 50. See text accompanying notes 78-82
infra for a discussion of problems arising when lenders must withhold substantial
sums.
69. "Draws against construction financing shall be made only after certification
of job progress by the general contractor and the owner or his agent in luch form as
may be prescribed by the lender." Ch. 47, § 2(), WASH. REV. CODE § 60.04.210(1)
(Supp. 1973). Although a "certification of job progress" is nothing new to most lend-
ers, who already demand comprehensive certificates of job progress on commercial
jobs before each draw, the legislature desired that lenders assume this supervisorial
responsibility on all types of projects to further insure that subcontractors will be
paid and the loan money not diverted elsewhere. Interview with Representative Richard
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Sums withheld pursuant to a stop notice may be released by the
lender only after written agreement between the stop notice claimant,
the owner-borrower and the general contractor, or after a court order,
71
unless the lender has the general contractor or borrower obtain a
lien-release bond for the claimant in the amount of the claim.72 If the
lender does not abide by the above procedures, and he continues to
make loan advances, his mortgage or deed of trust loses its priority
73
to the mechanics' lien of the PLC in the amount of the funds which
should have been withheld in response to the stop notice.74 If the
claimant has served an "unjust, excessive or premature" notice he
becomes liable for any resulting damages.75
A Washington subcontractor will find the stop notice most useful
when he has not received his last contract payment for his work on a
project and wants to make the lender aware of this fact and give him
the opportunity to satisfy this unpaid bill. The stop notice is especially
useful in this situation if the subcontractor expects a foreclosure of the
lender's prior mortgage or deed of trust, making the subcontractor's
potential mechanics' lien of little value.76 Even if the lender does not
Smythe, Cosponsor of S.H.B. 264, in Vancouver, Wn., Aug. 30, 1973. The change
effected by the Act in this regard will be in loans for residential rather than commer-
cial construction, where small builders had in the past more informal draw proce-
dures. Interview with Eric Pucher, supra note 50.
70. Ch. 47, § 2(4), WASH. REV. CODE § 60.04.210(4) (Supp. 1973).
71. Ch. 47, § 2(5), WASH. REV. CODE § 60.04.210(5) (Supp. 1973).
72. See text accompanying notes 83-88 infra.
73. Section 3 of the Act also affects mortgage and deed of trust priority over
subsequent encumbrances. See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
74. Ch. 47, § 2(6), WASH. REV. CODE § 60.04.210(6) (Supp. 1973). The stop
notice claimant must satisfy his claim by perfecting a mechanics' lien claim under
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 60.04.020, .060, .100 and .110 (1963). The mechanics' lien will
have this priority over the lender's mortgage, though the mortgage was recorded before
the stop notice claimant began work on the project. Interview with Representative
Richard Kelley, supra note 65.
75. Ch. 47, § 2(7), WASH. REV. CODE § 60.04.210(7) (Supp. 1973).
76. It is often the case that the first trust deed holder (ordinarily the construction
lender) forecloses his deed of trust when a job "goes sour," as evidenced by the
non-payment of laborers and materialmen. Unless the job claimant has a priority
over the lender's trust deed, which is seldom the case, the mechanic's lien right of
the claimant is terminated by the foreclosure. [In Washington, pendency of
mortgage foreclosure does not prevent mechanics' lien foreclosure on the same
property. Nason v. Northwestern Mill & Power Co., 17 Wash. 142, 49 P. 235
(1897)] Under these circumstances, the only remedy that the claimant will
ordinarily have, in addition to his direct contract cause of action, is resort to the
undisbursed construction fund. The claimant will only be able to reach those funds
if he has timely filed a stop notice and even if the mechanic's lien right remains
viable, the stop notice will prove an effective tool for negotiating with the owner
to obtain payment without full litigation.
Moss, The Stop Notice Remedy In California--Updated, 47 L.A. BAR BULL. 299.
299-300 (1972) (footnotes omitted).
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pay him, the subcontractor is better off for having filed the stop notice
under Section 2, for the subcontractor's subsequent mechanics' lien
will have a priority superior to the lender's mortgage-for the amount
due under the stop notice-if the lender disburses any more funds and
does not withhold any for the subcontractor. The subcontractor, then,
must set up an internal procedure to obtain the information required
on a stop notice for each job and to ensure that the notices are sent on
time and to all the proper parties.
77
Because it affects the loan funds held and disbursed by the lender,
the stop notice poses the threat of thwarting the success of the lender's
venture in at least two situations: (1) When a subcontractor submits a
large claim the validity of the amount of which the general contractor
disputes, and the lender withholds a large sum to meet the claim,
progress on the project will be inhibited until the dispute is settled and
the claimant paid;78 (2) When some subcontractors are not being
paid, a rumor that the developer/general contractor is having diffi-
culty getting his draws because the work is not progressing or passing
inspection may subject the lender to a flood of stop notices which
could effectively halt the project by tying up remaining loan funds
until the claims can be adjudicated. When loan money needed to
complete the project is withheld from the general contractor by stop
notice everyone concerned is hurt. The legislature should provide a
special summary proceeding whereby stop notice claims could be
quickly adjudicated, both to speed release of withheld funds79 and to
meet possible due process defects in the present procedure.80
77. See note 66 supra for the information required on stop notice claims to the
lender. In addition, PLC's must be able to show when their contract (or purchase
order) payment was due.
78. "The possibility that one claimant can impede the progress of the entire job
is probably the major objection to the stop notice remedy." Comment, California
Mechanics' Liens, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 331, 353 (1963). See also Illyin, Stop Notice!-
Construction Loan Officers' Nightmare, 16 HASTINGS L.J. (1964) [hereinafter cited
as Illyin]. This is the biggest worry of general contractors in Washington. Interview
with Dick Ducharme, Director of Public Affairs, Associated General Contractors of
America, Inc., in Seattle, Sept. 6, 1973.
79. California provides a special summary proceeding to resolve disputes con-
cerning stop notices filed on public projects. If the general contractor or any subcon-
tractor challenges a stop notice claim (by affidavit) to the public entity, the funds
withheld will be released unless a counter-affidavit is filed by the stop notice claimant.
In that event, either the claimant or the contractor may file in court for .a declaration
of the respective rights of the parties, and the court must grant a hearing within
fifteen days. The court may order the funds released or continued withheld. CALIF.
CIv. CODE §§ 3 197-3205 (West Supp. 1973).
80. Two recent United States Supreme Court decisions, Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), and Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972),
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With the present stop notice provisions, the lender, if he wants to
avoid a loss and see the project completed, must have a plan to pro-
tect himself against stop notices. He must employ preloan contract
precautions, carefully supervise the project to insure subcontractors
held that statutes authorizing the prejudgment impounding of property under less than
extraordinary circumstances violate due process unless there has first been notice to
the debtor and an opportunity for a hearing. If due process applies to the stop notice
remedy, the new Washington Act appears to violate due process. Neither adequate
notice nor opportunity for a hearing is provided by the Act; the stop notice claimant
merely files a claim with the lender, and the lender is then required either to withhold
enough loan funds from subsequent advances to meet the claim, as determined by the
formula of ch. 47, § 2(4), WASH. REV. CODE § 60.04.210(4) (Supp. 1973), or obtain
a lien release bond in the amount of the claim. Id. If the lender makes subsequent
advances on the construction loan without first satisfying the stop notice, his
mortgage loses its first lien priority to the subsequent mechanics' lien of the
PLC. Ch. 47, § 2(6), WASH. REV. CODE § 60.04.210(6) (Supp. 1973). The due
process requirements of Sniadach and Fuentes for prejudgment impounding of property
have been thus characterized: "Absent a valid waiver and except in extraordinary
situations, due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before any
person can be deprived of any significant property interest by state action." Leen,
Galbraith & Gant, Due Process and Deeds of Trust--Strange Bedfellows?, 48 WASH.
L. REV. 763, 767 (1973) (emphasis omitted).
Can the Washington stop notice remedy meet each of these due process requirements?
First, does the borrower or lender have a "significant property interest" in the funds
withheld by stop notice? The answer would appear to be yes, for both parties have
contractual rights with respect to these loan funds. Second. does the stop notice effect
a "deprivation" of these property interests? It has been argued that a construction
loan fund is held in trust for the benefit of those contributing to the improvement,
including the stop notice claimant, and hence no "deprivation" occurs. Moss, The
Stop Notice Remedy in California-~Updated, 47 L.A. BAR BULL. 299, 301-02 (1972).
The Washington court seems to accept the trust theory in Columbia Wood Products,
81 Wn. 2d at 900, 506 P.2d at 29-30. Query whether the requisite "deprivation" is
present in the stop notice. Third, does the stop notice remedy involve state action?
This question resembles the state action question posed by "self-help" under reposses-
sions under UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-503. See Adams v. Southern California
First National Bank, 42 U.S.L.W. 2230 (9th Cir. Oct. 30, 1973). It may be significant
that the stop notice remedy is purely statutory and not merely a codification of a
remedy at common law. 57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 114 (1948). In this situation,
then, it is unclear whether there exists sufficient state action to make the stop notice
subject to due process. Fourth, is the withholding of loan funds by stop notice an
"extraordinary situation"? Because the stop notice claimant has, in addition, both a
personal action against the property owner and the traditional mechanics' lien on the
property itself, the stop notice would not seem to qualify under the narrow Fuentes
"extraordinary situation" test. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 91-92. Except for the possible
nonexistence of a "deprivation" of property interests by the stop notice, the Fuentes
due process requirements seem to apply to the new remedy.
Does the new act comply? As mentioned above, neither adequate notice nor oppor-
tunity for a hearing is provided by the Act. The hearing requirement would be satisfied
by the adoption of a summary proceeding for stop notice claims similar to the one in
California for public works stop notices, supra note 79, so long as the hearing occurs
before the stop notice takes effect. As to the notice requirement, California's require-
ment on private works of a preliminary notice to the owner, lender and general
contractor served twenty days before the stop notice may be a solution. It is not clear
whether mere notice and the opportunity to go to court to restrain entry of the stop
notice order satisfies the "opportunity to be heard requirement" of the due process cases.
It should be remembered that due process rights can be contractually waived.
Overmyer v. Frick, 405 U.S. 174 (1972). Such a waiver must be "'voluntarily.
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are paid and develop procedures to deal with the inevitable stop no-
tices which will be received.81 Also, lenders should consider exercising
intelligently, and knowingly' made." Id. at 187. Hence attorneys who represent PLC's
and who are uncertain about the constitutionality of Washington's new Act would be
well-advised to draft contracts which explicitly waive the due process rights of the
borrower or the lender with regard to the stop notice.
Absent valid waiver, to satisfy due process deficiencies under the new Act attorneys
for PLC's could initiate show cause proceedings ordering opposing parties to appear
and show cause either why loan funds should not be withheld to satisfy the stop
notice, or why the PLC's mechanics' lien should not be given priority to the lender's
mortgage. Such a procedure might be constitutional under the rationale of Rogoski
v. Hammond, 9 Wn. App. 500, 513 P.2d 285 (1973) (show cause proceeding under
WASH. REV. CODE § 2.28.150 (1963) provides sufficient opportunity to be heard to
satisfy due process requirements in a prejudgment attachment situation). If a judicial
hearing is required to meet due process objections, it would be preferable to amend
the new stop notice statute to establish a special summary procedure tailored to meet
the particular needs of the situation which the stop notice provision was designed to
remedy.
81. Lenders and their title insurers have always, and still must, supervise the
project and insure that loan funds are not diverted elsewhere for the sake of the
construction loan's security-the improvement itself. Waivers from subcontractors and
indemnities from builders are some protection against mechanics' liens. This procedure
need not change. Like subcontractors, however, lenders also must develop new pro-
cedures to deal with stop notices which will be received by the lender no matter
how carefully he supervises the disbursement of funds. No system of fund disburse-
ment is infallible. The writer's suggested stop notice guidelines for the lender are the
following:
(I) If all loan funds have been disbursed after certifications of job progress for
each draw, as required by ch. 47, § 2(1), WASH. REV. CODE § 60.04.210(1) (Supp.
1973), then the stop notice is ineffective when received.
(2) If a payment bond has been provided equal to at least 50% of the loan, the
lender may disregard the stop notice claim if it's from a PLC covered by the bond.
Ch. 47, § 2(4), WASH. REV. CODE § 60.04.210(4) (Supp. 1973). And if a lien release
bond is provided for a particular stop notice claim, no money need be withheld for
that claim.
(3) The lender should consult the requirements for proper stop notice form fn
ch. 47, § 2(2), WASH. REV. CODE § 60.04.210(2) (Supp. 1973), listed at note 66 supra.
Whether less than strict adherence to these requirements will defeat the stop notice
claim is unknown at present, although the Washington court in Wells v.
Scott, supra note 66, held that the mechanics' lien remedy will be strictly construed.
(4) The lender should retain the envelope in which the stop notice is received
because a stop notice mailed more than 40 days after a contract or purchase order
payment is due cannot compel withholding for that payment. Ch. 47, § 2(2), WASH.
REv. CODE § 60.04.210(2) (Supp. 1973).
(5) Is the stop notice claim one for labor and materials on the proper project?
The lender need not withhold any part of the claim relating to another, separately
funded construction project. If the mistake of the claimant is deliberate, ch. 47,
§ 2(4), WASH. REV. CODE § 60.04.210(4) (Supp. 1973), provides damages for the
lender and others.
(6) If the notice is valid the lender need withhold only enough funds to satisfy
the claim, using the formula of ch. 47, § 2(4), WASH. REV. CODE § 60.04.210(4) (Supp. 1973),
discussed at note 68 supra. The remainder of the loan fund may be disbursed as
originally planned. (Title companies now advise lenders to withhold 100% of the
claim and not use the unmanageable formula. Interview with Frank Soderling, supra
note 45.)
(7) The lender ought to provide in the building loan agreement that the contractor
or borrower must provide the lien release bonds described in ch. 47, § 2(4), WASH.
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more control over loan disbursements than the progress payment
system allows, perhaps by replacing it with a "voucher system"
whereby the lender pays the subcontractor directly upon presentation
of a voucher.
82
Payment bonds83 will exempt the lender from having to withhold
loan funds in two situations. If there is a payment bond of at least fifty
percent of the construction loan, the lender is not required to ac-
knowledge any stop notice claims which are covered under the bond.
84
If the lender can obtain from the borrower or general contractor a
REV. CODE § 60.04.210(4) (Supp. 1973) or obtain a release of the stop notice from
the claimant, and that the lender retains the right to withhold 100% of any stop
notice claim received. How much the lender can affect the stop notice claimant's
rights by contract with the owner is unclear. See A-1 Door & Materials Co. v. Fresno
Guarantee Savings & Loan Ass'n, 61 Cal. 2d 725, 40 Cal. Rptr. 85, 90, 394 P.2d 829.
834 (1964), where the court, speaking of stop notice claimants' rights in California,
pointed out that, "[ii f the terms of that contract [between lender and borrower]
determined the rights of the claimants . . . the parties to the contract could effectively
eliminate those rights. They might, for example, condition the lender's obligation to
pay on there being no stop notices filed."
Washington title insurance companies will insure that the lender's mortgage has
not lost its priority to stop notice claims because of the penalty clause of ch. 47, § 2(6).
WASH. REV. CODE § 60.04.210(6) (Supp. 1973), if the lender complies with ch. 47.
§§ 2(4)-(5), WASH. REV. CODE § 60.04.210(4)-(5) (Supp. 1973). The difficulty in
providing this insurance is that a stop notice, although not a lien of record, may cause
a loss of mortgage priority. Letter to Customers, Pioneer National Title Insurance
Company of Washington, July 26, 1973; Letter to Customers, First American Title
Company of Washington, Seattle, July 13, 1973.
82. This "voucher system" is popular in California. Dent & Goulden, More on
Mechanics' Liens, Stop Notices and the Like, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 179, 199-200 n.118
(1966); Illyin, supra note 78. at 193-94. The California Court of Appeals has made
similar suggestions to lenders who want to avoid stop notices:
[A] lender rather than making progress payments according to the reports of its
appraiser, that is, solely on the value of the construction work completed, can
incorporate provisions in the "Building Loan Agreement and Assignment of
Account" for the payment of mechanics and materialmen as a prerequisite to
progress payments. Receipted bills can be made a condition precedent to payment.
or in lieu of receipted bills, unpaid bills to be paid by check made payable jointly
to the owner and the mechanic or materialman, or perhaps to be paid directly to
the mechanic or materialman upon order of the owner.
Rossman Mill & Lumber Co. v. Fullerton Say. & Loan Ass'n, 221 Cal. App. 2d 705,
34 Cal. Rptr. 644, 647 (1963).
83. A "payment" or "labor and material" bond serves to:
[P] rotect a contracting party from claims by third persons by guaranteeing to
the obligee that all labor and material bills incurred by the principal will be
paid. Should the principal [here, the general contractor] default, the surety
would be responsible to the named obligee [here, the borrower] and also to
unpaid subcontractors and-materialmen who dealt with the principal, as third party
beneficiaries, for payment of labor and material bills.
Moss, Bond Practices, 44 J. STATE B. CALIF. 537 (1969).
84. Ch. 47, § 2, WASH. REV. CODE § 60.04.210 (Supp. 1973). In spite of the
unequivocal language of ch. 47, a subcontractor's problems may not be solved by a
payment bond. For example, a normal payment bond will cover only contracts made
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lien release bond for the benefit of the claimant in the amount of a
stop notice claim received, the lender need not withhold any funds for
that individual claim.85 This lien release bond of Section 2(4) has one
disadvantage as a solution to the problem of releasing loan funds once
withheld; because most stop notice claims have some validity, a surety
will require collateral for the bond, perhaps up to one hundred per-
cent of the claim.
86
Although payment bonds are usually provided in large construction
projects to assure all subcontractors of payment,87 there are several
situations in which they are usually not provided and in which sub-
contractors must rely on stop notices and mechanics' liens: (1) Specu-
lative homebuilding, in which the owner-general contractor relation-
ship is normally not present; (2) where the general contractor is not
considered a good risk; (3) where the borrower wants to "risk it"
rather than make the expenditure for the bond.
88
III. CONCLUSION
The Washington Legislature's 1973 additions to R.C.W. ch. 60.04
-the new "stop notice" remedy for subcontractors and the revised
mortgage priorities-represent some praiseworthy updating and inno-
by the general contractor, and if the ownerlborrower himself contracts for work on the
project, the subcontractor will have no recourse to the bond but will have to file a stop
notice. And if the payment bond covers only "first tier" subcontractors, it would appear
that second or third tier subcontractors will also have their remedy in a stop notice
rather than the payment bond.
85. Ch. 47, § 2(4), WASH. REV. CODE § 60.04.210(4) (Supp. 1973). This is a
bond in which the owner, general contractor, lender or subcontractor is the principal
and the stop notice claimant is the obligee/beneficiary for all of the stop notice claim,
conditioned to pay any judgment the claimant may recover on his stop notice claim.
86. Still, the bond has two advantages: (1) The money withheld by the lender
can be released, with the bond satisfying the subcontractor; (2) if the subcontractor
is simply paid part or all of his claim, instead of a bond being provided, it might be
difficult to get any of this payment back from an insolvent subcontractor when the
claim, is later adjudicated. Interview with Dick Ericson, Area Surety Manager, Safeco
Ins. Co., in Seattle, Sept. 11, 1973.
87. Ironically, it is on these large projects, which are usually undertaken by the
most responsible and best capitalized parties, that the protection of bonding is least
needed by the subcontractor. Comment, Mechanics' Liens and Surety Bonds in the
Building Trades, 68 YALE L.J. 138, 167 (1958).
88. Interview with Dick Ericson, supra note 86. See PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE,
REAL ESTATE CONSTRUCTION 153 (J. McCord ed. 1969): "You may ask why such a
small percentage of private construction work is bonded. Frankly, the only answer
that comes to mind is the economic one. Apparently, many owners are reluctant to
pay the premium, or perhaps feel that they can get a lower contract price from a
contractor who is not required to obtain a bond."
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vation within the scheme of antiquated and unfair laws under which
the construction industry has been forced to operate. The small sub-
contractor for whom the mechanics' lien is an unsatisfactory remedy
and the homeowner who often paid for improvements a second time
solely to remove a mechanics' lien from his property were the in-
tended beneficiaries of the stop notice. Now the subcontractor will
often be able to satisfy his unpaid bills directly out of construction
loan funds held by the lender for the project, thereby also decreasing
the chance that a mechanics' lien will be perfected on the owner's
property.
In spite of ch. 47's commendable initiation of the stop notice
remedy in Washington, what the legislature sought with the stop
notice-a smooth and efficient way for all-important construction
monies to be distributed during construction-has yet to be achieved.
The formula by which the lender decides how much to withhold in
response to a stop notice claim is unnecessarily confusing, and unless
the lender is prepared to withhold the full amount the stop notice
asks, there seems to be no assurance of a quick resolution of the sub-
contractor's claim. In addition, the paperwork burden on the subcon-
tractor who wants to make use of the stop notice is unnecessarily
heavy. He must keep a mechanics' lien available to himself under
R.C.W. ch. 60.04, as well as giving proper stop notice claims under
ch. 47.
Although the stop notice means new paperwork and additional su-
pervisorial responsibilities for the construction lender, the Act mollifies
lenders with favorable new mortgage priorities. They are relieved
from the uncertainties and unfairness of Columbia Wood Products;
the Act gives all future advances under a mortgage or deed of trust
priority over intervening encumbrances on the construction project,
even if the advances are voluntary advances.
Richard Paroutaud
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